Cascaded Data Encryption Dependent on Attributes of Physical Memory

ABSTRACT

Apparatus and method for providing data security through cascaded encryption. In accordance with various embodiments, input data are encrypted in relation to a first auxiliary data value to provide first level ciphertext. The first level ciphertext are encrypted using a second auxiliary data value associated with a selected physical location in a memory to produce second level ciphertext, which are thereafter stored to the selected physical location. In some embodiments, migration of the stored data to a new target location comprises partial decryption and re-encryption of the data using a third auxiliary data value associated with a new target physical location to produce third level ciphertext, and the storage of the third level ciphertext to the new target physical location.

RELATED APPLICATION

This application is a continuation of copending U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 13/098,027 filed on Apr. 29, 2011 which will issue on Oct. 14,2014 as U.S. Pat. No. 8,862,902.

SUMMARY

Various embodiments of the present invention are generally directed toenhancing data security in a memory through a cascaded encryptionoperation that uses auxiliary data selected in relation to one or moreattributes of physical memory at which the encrypted data are stored.

In accordance with some embodiments, a method generally comprisesencrypting input data in relation to a first auxiliary data value toprovide first level ciphertext. The first level ciphertext are encryptedin relation to a second auxiliary data value associated with a selectedphysical location in a memory to provide second level ciphertext. Thesecond level ciphertext are thereafter stored in the selected physicallocation in the memory.

These and other features and advantages which characterize the variousembodiments of the present invention can be understood in view of thefollowing detailed discussion and the accompanying drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a generalized functional representation of an exemplary datastorage device operated in accordance with various embodiments of thepresent invention.

FIG. 2 is an exemplary functional block diagram of the device of FIG. 1.

FIG. 3 illustrates read/write/erase circuitry of FIG. 2 in accordancewith some embodiments.

FIG. 4 illustrates a portion of the memory module of FIG. 1 inaccordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 5 provides an exemplary format for a page of memory from FIG. 4.

FIG. 6 depicts an exemplary encryption sequence in which doubleencryption is applied to data stored to a selected page of memory inaccordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 7 depicts an exemplary encryption sequence in which doubleencryption is applied to data copied to a new page of memory inaccordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 8 depicts the use of cipher block chaining (CBC) encryption inaccordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 9 shows the use of counter (CTR) mode encryption in accordance withsome embodiments.

FIG. 10 is a CASCADED ENCRYPTION routine generally illustrative of stepscarried out in accordance with various embodiments.

FIG. 11 shows an exemplary format of the memory of the device of FIG. 1as an array of flash memory cells.

FIG. 12 shows an exemplary format of the memory of the device of FIG. 1as a rotatable storage medium.

FIG. 13 shows an exemplary format of the memory of the device of FIG. 1as an array of spin-torque transfer random access memory (STRAM) cells.

FIG. 14 shows an exemplary format of the memory of the device of FIG. 1as an array of resistive random access memory (RRAM) cells.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The present disclosure generally relates to data security. Dataencryption can be employed to encrypt data stored to a memory of a datastorage device in order to reduce the ability of an unauthorized partyto access the stored data. Encryption generally involves thetransformation of an input data sequence (plaintext) to an encryptedoutput data sequence (cyphertext) using a selected encryption algorithm(cipher). The cipher may utilize one or more pieces of auxiliary data(e.g. keys, initial values, tweak values) to effect the transformation.In this context, plaintext can include data that have been previouslyencrypted by an upstream encryption process.

Some types of memory devices are configured to write each new version ofa particular set of data to a different location within a memory, suchas in the case of flash memory arrays. Blocks of memory cells that storeolder versions of the data can be scheduled for erasure using abackground garbage collection operation. If such erasures have not yettaken place at the time of a system attack, an attacker may be able tolocate multiple versions of the same data, and use this information tohelp break a particular cipher and recover the stored data.

Even if prior versions of a set of data have been erased and overwrittenwith new data, a number of laboratory techniques can be used by anattacker to detect previously stored data signatures, which may leavethe system open to the recovery of the stored data. Such techniques canalso be used by an attacker to gain valuable information about thestored data, such as the number of recent data changes and the extent ofthese changes, the types of software applications that have been used tohandle the data, the kind and organization of the file system, thepresence of data compression, and so on.

One particular security concern is malleability: if an attacker is ableto locate a current version and a previous version of a particular setof data, the attacker may be able to use similarities between theserespective data sets to recover the data or uncover valuable relatedinformation. For example, swapping two versions of a data set in astorage medium may cause a restoration of an earlier version of thedata, even if the attacker does not know which set is current.

Accordingly, various embodiments of the present invention are generallydirected to an apparatus and method for securing data stored to a memoryof a data storage device through the use of cascaded (multi-level) dataencryption. At least one of the encryption levels uses secret auxiliarydata, such as a secret key not generally available external to thestorage device. The secret data incorporates information associated withone or more attributes of the physical location in the memory at whichthe data are stored. Such attributes may include the physical blockaddress of the storage location, write/erase counts, timestampinformation associated with the physical write to the storage location,and so on. Any number, type and combinations of suitable attributes canbe used, so that this list is merely exemplary and is not limiting.

Migration of the data from a first location to a second location in thememory may involve a partial decryption of the data so that less thanall of the encryption levels are removed, followed by the additionalencryption of the data using auxiliary data selected in relation to anattribute associated with the second location. In some cases, a newsecret key may be used that is associated with the second location. Inthis way, multiple versions of the same data sets concurrently residentin different locations in the memory will have been differentlyencrypted using different attribute data, and will therefore not beeasily detectable by an attacker.

Without limitation and merely by way of illustration, in someembodiments the first level of encryption can be configured in such away as to depend on a derived key associated with a range of logicalblock addresses (LBAs). Such encryption may also depend, e.g., may beinitialized or tweaked by, individual LBA values associated with thedata, as desired. In this way, the same data at different locations willbe encrypted as different ciphertext blocks. While different keys forevery individual LBA can be used, such may be unwieldy and indeed,unnecessary if a band approach is used. A tweak or initial value for thecipher can be used, including a publicly known value, as desired.

In virtualized storage devices (where the logical block address does notalways correspond to a constant physical address) older versions of thedata may linger in unmapped or unerased physical locations. If thebeginnings of these data versions are the same, the beginnings of thecorresponding ciphertext may also be the same, which may permit anattacker to identify two (or more) versions of the same data in thevirtualized storage medium, and derive some side information about theactivities of the user, the software, etc. This may enable the attackerto restore a previous version of the data by swapping the ciphertextblocks of the old and the new versions of the data.

To make the identification of partially changed data blocks moredifficult for an attacker, various embodiments presented herein canemploy a second level of encryption. This second level of encryption mayuse one or more keys stored in the storage device hardware, and theseencryption algorithms may depend on auxiliary data that depend onattributes associated with physical memory where the data are to bestored. The key values can take any number of forms, and can be used toinitialize or tweak the encryption, or in some other manner. Thesediversify the ciphertext stored in different locations in the memory.

Although not required, storing the second level key(s) in the devicehardware so that it is available to the storage device can be useful insome cases in enabling the storage device to perform optimization,housekeeping and other memory management related tasks when the userand/or host system is not present to provide any keys or otherinformation to unlock the data, or otherwise supply information for keyderivation.

These and various other features will now be discussed in greaterdetail. FIG. 1 shows a block diagram for a data storage device 100 inwhich various embodiments of the present invention can be practiced. Thedevice 100 includes a top level controller 102 and a memory module 104.The controller 102 may be programmable or hardware based and directs I/Ooperations with a host device (not shown). The controller 102 may be aseparate component or may be incorporated directly into the memorymodule 104.

FIG. 2 shows the device 100 in accordance with some embodiments. Forpurposes of FIG. 2, it is contemplated that the device 100 constitutes aflash memory device, such as a solid-state drive (SSD) or portablememory stick (thumb drive) that uses a flash memory array. Thecontroller 102 uses an interface (I/F) circuit 106 with a buffer 108 tocommunicate with the host device. The buffer 108 may store programmingand other information used by the controller during operation, and mayfurther temporarily cache data during transfer between the host deviceand the memory 104. A read/write/erase (R/W/E) circuit 110 controls datatransfers with the memory 104.

FIG. 3 represents the R/W/E circuitry and the memory 104 in someembodiments. Data are stored as an arrangement of rows and columns ofmemory cells 112, accessible by various row and column control lines.Control logic 114 receives and transfers data, addressing informationand control/status values along multi-line bus paths 116, 118 and 120,respectively.

Column and row decoding circuitry 122, 124 provide appropriate switchingand other functions to access the cells 112. A write circuit 126represents circuitry elements that operate to carry out write operationsto write data to the cells 112, and a read circuit 128 operates toobtain readback data from the cells. Local buffering of transferred dataand other values can be provided via one or more local buffers (dataregisters) 130.

FIG. 4 shows the memory 104 arranged as an array of erasure blocks 132in accordance with some embodiments. Each erasure block 132 is formedfrom a number of rows and columns of flash memory cells 112. Eacherasure block constitutes the smallest increment of memory that can beerased at a time. An exemplary block size might be 128 rows (pages),with each page storing 8192 bytes (8 KB). Other sizes and configurationscan be used.

A full page's worth of data may be written to each page during a datawrite operation. Data may be supplied by the host in the form of fixedsized sectors with an associated logical address (such as a logicalblock address, LBA). In response, the device 100 selects an associatedphysical address (such as a physical block address, PBA) in the array tostore the data. The PBA may include erasure block, page and bit locationinformation.

Multiple LBAs may be written to the same page, and a given LBA's worthof data may by physically stored so as to span multiple pages. Fillerbits may be appended to a selected set of input data if a full pageworth of data is not supplied for writing in a given write operation.Error correction codes (such as parity bits, etc.) may be incorporatedat the page level to correct errors as a full page worth of data isretrieved. Lossless data compression may also be applied to reduce thedata footprint.

A new physical address may be selected for a given set of data each timethat data are written to the memory 104. FIG. 4 shows a selected LBA Xthat has been stored to the array 104 three different times in threedifferent locations, as versions V1-V3. The different versions may beupdated versions of the LBA user data resulting from an editingoperation at the host level. Alternatively, the different versions mayinclude identical copies of the same LBA user data resulting from agarbage collection or other memory management operation by the device100. While each of the versions V1-V3 in FIG. 4 is stored in a differenterasure block 132, the same erasure block could store multiple versionsof the same LBA.

FIG. 5 shows an exemplary format for a page 134 of memory from theerasure blocks 132 of FIG. 4. It will be appreciated that any number ofdifferent formats for the memory can be used, so FIG. 5 is merelyillustrative of one such format. In some embodiments, the page 134 isarranged to have a user data portion 136 and a metadata portion 138. Theuser data portion 136 is configured to store up to a selected amount ofencoded host data. The metadata portion 138 stores metadata, which iscontrol information associated with the user data portion 136. A varietyof metadata formats can be used, such as data stored in a logicaladdress (LBA) field 140, a status field 142, and one or more count valuefields 144.

The LBA field 140 stores a logical address (e.g., a logical blockaddress (LBA) value) associated with the data in the user data field136. The data status field 142 stores data associated with the status ofsaid user data; for example, a flag may be set to indicate that a laterversion of the data is stored elsewhere in the array. The count valuefield 144 may provide a total accumulated count of write operations thathave taken place upon the associated physical address. For clarity,write operations in this context may denote data writes and/or erasures.

While the metadata can be physically stored in each page 134, it iscommon to store the metadata elsewhere, such as in specially designatedmetadata pages/fields at the end of each erasure block. Alternatively,the metadata may be stored in one or more specially designated metadataerasure blocks dedicated to this purpose, or somewhere else in asuitable location in the storage device or elsewhere. During operation,the metadata may be retrieved from non-volatile memory and placed in alocal volatile cache for use by the controller 102. A logical-physicaladdress conversion table may be generated from the metadata and storedin local memory for access by the controller.

The erasure blocks 132 are allocated on an as-needed basis, with wearleveling techniques applied in an effort to distribute writes in anominally even fashion across the array. Data are usually writtensequentially to each page in turn starting with the first page in theerasure block, so newer data will generally be present in lower (laterwritten) pages in the block and older data will be present in higherpages (earlier written) in the block.

A cascaded encryption scheme is utilized to protect the data stored inthe various pages 134 of memory. The scheme can be applied to theencoded user data in portion 136, the associated metadata in portion138, or both. Different encryption schemes can be applied to each typeof data. The memory can further be divided into bands (subgroups) withdifferent encryption schemes, including different security levels,applied to each band.

The cascaded encryption as exemplified herein employs various encryptionand decryption blocks to carry out on-the-fly encryption and decryptionof the data. These blocks may be realized in software, firmware orhardware. In some embodiments, the encryption/decryption operations arecarried out by the controller 102.

FIG. 6 illustrates an exemplary encryption/decryption sequence in whichuser data supplied by the host device are double encrypted and stored toa selected page of memory 134 during a write operation. The data arethereafter double decrypted and returned to the host during a subsequentread operation.

A first encryption module (engine) 150 applies a first level ofencryption to a set of input user data using a first cipher algorithm.Initial processing of the input data may have been applied by thecontroller, such as error encoding and compression, prior to encryption.The first encryption module 150 applies a first level cipher inaccordance with a first type of auxiliary data, such as a first levelkey (Key 1) to generate first level encrypted data. The first level keymay include a logical address (such as a logical block address, LBA)associated with the input data. Additionally or alternatively, the firstkey may be a public key that is generated, known and/or discoverableoutside the storage device 100. The first key may be supplied by thehost at the time of the transfer of the input user data.

The first encrypted data are subjected to a second level of encryptionby a second encryption module 152. The second module 152 applies asecond cipher that may be the same as, or different from, the firstcipher. The second cipher uses a second piece of auxiliary data, such asa hidden second key (Key 2). The second key (or other auxiliary data) isinternally generated by, and remains private to, the storage device 100.The second encryption module 152 produces second level encrypted data,which are then stored to a selected page 134 in a selected erasure block132.

During a subsequent read operation to retrieve the originally storeduser data back to the host, a first decryption module 154 uses thesecond key to remove the second level of decryption from the encodeddata. The first decryption module 154 may be the same operational blockas the second encryption module 152, or may be a different module. Thisdecryption operation reproduces the first encrypted data.

The first encrypted data are subjected to a second decryption operationby a second decryption module 156, which uses the first key to reproducethe originally stored user data. As before, the second decryption module156 may be the same block as the first encryption module 150. Therecovered data are thereafter returned to the host. While notspecifically shown in FIG. 6, it will be appreciated other processingsteps may be taken upon the recovered data, such as error detection andcorrection and data decompression, prior to the transfer of therecovered user data to the host.

The various encryption and decryption blocks of FIG. 6 can utilize anynumber of different ciphers, such as but not limited to counter (CTR)mode encryption, cipher block chaining (CBC) encryption, XTS mode(XOR-Encrypt-XOR based Tweaked CodeBook mode (TCB) with CipherTextStealing), and mixing layer encryption (e.g., EME2). Any suitableencryption cipher can be used, and different ciphers can be used indifferent locations and/or at different times. In at least someembodiments, the first auxiliary data (e.g. Key 1) is based on a logicaladdress attribute associated with the input data, and the secondauxiliary data (e.g., Key 2) is based on a physical address attributeassociated with the data. While the first and second auxiliary datavalues used by the respective encryption modules are characterized inFIG. 6 as keys, it will be appreciated that these can be used in otherways, such as initialization vectors, tweak values, and so on.

FIG. 7 shows another cascaded encryption operation in accordance withvarious embodiments. In FIG. 7, data are initially stored in a firstmemory location, and then subsequently moved internally by the device100 to a second memory location. This may be part of a garbagecollection operation by the device, or some other memory managementoperation such as the updating of a larger user file that involvesmultiple LBAs in a read-update-write sequence.

Double encrypted data are stored to a first page of memory (denoted at158) as discussed above in FIG. 6 using cascaded encryption blocks 150,152. A data migration operation is subsequently carried out in which thedata are moved to a second page of memory 160. It is contemplated thatthe first and second pages 158, 160 will be in different erasure blocks132, but such is not necessarily required.

To subsequently copy the data to the second page 160, the firstdecryption module 154 from FIG. 6 is used to remove the second level ofencryption from the stored data to provide the first encrypted data. Athird encryption module 162 applies a different second level ofencryption to the data using a third auxiliary data value, such as anencryption key (Key 3). The resulting ciphertext data are stored to thesecond page 160.

It will be noted that the module 162 may use the same cipher as themodule 156, or may use a different cipher. If the same cipher is used,module 162 may be the same module as module 156, which in turn may bethe same module as module 150. Thus, the respective operations of FIGS.6 and 7 can be carried out by two encryption/decryption engines, one foreach level. In other embodiments, a single encryption/decryption enginecarries out all the requisite encryption and decryption operationsrepresented in FIGS. 6-7 using different auxiliary data values and dataflows. For example, the controller 102 in FIGS. 1-2 can be programmed toperform these operations.

It can be seen from FIG. 7 that the memory stores two copies of the sameplaintext, albeit in encrypted form, in two separate physical locations.Should an attacker gain access to the contents of the respective firstand second pages 158, 160, the different encryption keys applied theretowill tend to prevent the attacker from easily determining that the samecore user data are stored in each of these locations. Hiding theunderlying commonality of the plaintext thus increases the security ofthe system.

FIG. 8 shows an exemplary encryption module 170 that may be incorporatedinto the cascaded sequences of FIGS. 6-7. In some embodiments, theencryption module 170 corresponds to the first encryption module 150 andcarries out the first level of encryption using a cipher block chaining(CBC) encryption algorithm. The CBC cipher converts the input user data(plaintext, P) to first encrypted data (ciphertext, C) using one or morekey values based on logical addressing associated with the input data.

In FIG. 8, the input data are temporarily stored in a buffer memorylocation 172 and arranged as N sequential blocks 174, where N is aplural integer. Each of the N blocks comprises a multi-bit block ofM-bits, such as 128 bits although other block sizes can be used. It iscontemplated that each block will be the same size, although this is notnecessarily required. Filler bits can be appended as required.

A seed value for the encryption is generated by a seed value generator176. The seed value is a multi-bit input value that serves as aninitialization vector (IV) to initiate the CBC encryption process. Insome embodiments, the seed value includes a logical address associatedwith the input data, such as the LBA value. The seed value mayadditionally or alternatively include other information supplied by thehost or generated internally by the device 100. It will be appreciatedthat this seed value constitutes at least a portion of the auxiliarydata used during the encryption process. A first selected block 178(block 1) of the input data is logically combined with the seed value toform an M-bit result (PP). The logical combination of the selected blockand the seed value can take any suitable form, such as through anexclusive-or (XOR) function 180. The output of the XOR function 180 issupplied to a block cipher encryption module 182 which carries out anencryption operation using a second input value to provide an M-bitencrypted block 184 of ciphertext (C). It is contemplated that theencrypted block will have the same number of bits as the originalplaintext block 178, although such is not necessarily required.

Any suitable encryption operation can be carried out by the encryptionmodule 182. This can include a simple XOR operation with the secondinput value, or a more complex cipher algorithm.

The second input value used by the block 182 can take any number offorms. In some embodiments, the second input value also uses a logicaladdress associated with the input data, such as the LBA, although otherforms of input value can be used. It will be appreciated that the inputvalue in FIG. 8 is also an exemplary type of auxiliary data that can beused during the encryption operation. The encrypted block 184 (encblock 1) serves as a seed for the encoding of a second plaintext block186 (block 2) of the input data. The encrypted block 1 is logicallycombined using a suitable function such as an XOR with plaintext block2, and the result is encrypted to provide a second encrypted block (encblock 2) 188. This process continues until all N blocks of input datahave been encrypted, resulting in a set of single (first) encrypted data190.

FIG. 9 shows another exemplary encryption module 200 that may beincorporated into the sequences of FIGS. 6-7. In some embodiments, theencryption module 200 corresponds to the second encryption module 152,and employs counter (CTR) mode encryption. The encryption of module 200uses one or more input auxiliary values based on physical addressinformation associated with the input data.

A counter value generator 202 generates an input count value. In someembodiments, this count value is generated from a combination of thephysical address of the memory location to which the data are to bewritten, and a write count of writes and/or erasures that have takenplace to said location. For example, the count value could be a 20 bitwrite count value added to a 44 bit physical address value, repeatedtwice, and concatenated to a final desired size (e.g., 128 bits). The 20bit write count value may be derived from the associated metadata(portion 138, FIG. 5). The 44 bit physical address value may identifythe physical location in memory in terms of various addressingparameters such as die, stripe, erasure block, page (row number),starting bit location, etc.

Generating the counter value in this way helps ensure that each countvalue will be unique, and can be easily reconstructed during asubsequent decryption event. This exemplary scheme also allows dataassociated with the same LBA to be stored to different pages in the sameerasure block. Other forms of counter values can be used, includingcounter values that do not include any physical address information atall (e.g., neither write counts nor physical block addresses, etc.).

The count value is subjected to a block cipher encryption operation byencryption block 204. The cipher used by block 204 may be the same as,or different from, the cipher of block 182 in FIG. 8. The cipher ofblock 204 utilizes a second input value which, as desired, canincorporate physical address information associated with the target page(e.g., write count value, PBA, etc). For reference, the count value andthe second input value are each considered exemplary forms of auxiliarydata values for the module 200. Encryption algorithms that use a singleauxiliary data value can be used.

The output ciphertext from block 204 is combined using an XOR function206 with the single encrypted data 190 output by the system 170 of FIG.8. The output of the XOR function 206 provides double (second) encrypteddata 208, which are then stored to an appropriate memory location asdiscussed above in FIGS. 6-7.

The physical address information associated with the second encryptionlevel in the various encryption schemes disclosed herein can take anynumber of forms, such as a physical address (block, page, bit range,etc.), a time/date stamp associated with the write event, a write count,or some other internally generated value uniquely associated with thetarget location in the memory. In at least some embodiments, the secondlevel of encryption can further use an internally generated globalauxiliary data (such as a global key) that is applied on all secondlevel encryptions to all locations in the array. Different global keyscan be generated for different portions (bands) of the may. It iscontemplated that such global keys (or other forms of global auxiliarydata) will be generated internally and remain essentially undiscoverableby outside attack.

The exemplary cascaded encryption presented by FIGS. 6-9 enhances datasecurity including on the basis that the second encryption uses a hiddenauxiliary data value, known only to the internal circuitry of the datastorage device 100, and which is not easily accessible by an attacker.Preferably, the hidden data value is independent from any other of thedata encryption values used to encrypt the data.

The security requirements for the second level of encryption can be lessstringent than those for the first layer, since no chosen or plaintextattacks appear to be feasible upon the double encrypted data. Thus,counter mode encryption as exemplified in FIG. 9 may be a suitablechoice for the second level of encryption, although other modes canreadily be used.

Counter (CTR) mode is particularly suitable because it is simple, fastand parallelizable. CTR mode decryption can be carried out using thesame encryption core. CTR mode is believed to be sufficiently securewhen already encrypted data are protected to hide equality of datablocks. Some plaintext header information can be attached to the storedblocks as desired. The counter values will always be different, so therewill be no leakage of the header information, even if only differing byone bit.

If an attacker flips a bit of the header part of the stored data, thecorresponding decrypted header will have a flipped bit. In this way,known changes can be made to the header when the attacker correctlyguesses the header position, which can be a non-negligible danger.However, it is believed that the header information, even if discovered,will not leak any useful information about the associated user data orencryption applied thereto.

In further embodiments, double tweaked wide encryption is anothersuitable encryption approach. This approach reduces the possibility ofduplicate ciphertext blocks. Altering the ciphertext using doubletweaked wide encryption generally results in the randomization of alarge amount of decrypted plaintext.

In one approach, a double tweaked LION cipher can be used, whichprovides a good tradeoff between security and speed (core size). Thisapproach uses two stream ciphers. The first stream cipher is tweaked bythe LBA and uses a user input (band) key. The second stream cipher istweaked by physical address information and is further keyed by a globalhidden key. There can be a hash stage in between the two ciphers, whichfurther tweaks the initialization of the second cipher.

In another approach, an Encryption-Mix-Encryption mode is used. A layerof XTS mode encryption can be implemented, tweaked by the encrypted LBAand by the positions of cipher blocks inside the logical blocks, usingthe user's band key. A mixing layer can be used to process the outputblocks of the first layer. The mixing layer can be chosen from anynumber of suitable constructions known in the art.

A suitable function is the EME2 mix function, which reduces the securitybound to 2⁶⁴ sectors encrypted with the same key. A 256 bit mix versionof the EME2 cipher could be used, which offers a security bound of 2¹²⁸encryptions. A Pseudo-Hadamard transform could also be employed, as wellas other alternatives which will readily occur to the skilled artisan inview of the present disclosure. A second layer of XTS mode can then beapplied, tweaked by a write count and physical address information, andby the position of the cipher blocks therein.

FIG. 10 provides a flowchart for a CASCADED ENCRYPTION routine 220 tosummarize the foregoing discussion. Data to be stored to a memory arereceived at step 222. These data may be user data supplied by a host, inwhich case the data may be supplied in conjunction with a write commandthat includes logical addressing, such as an associated LBA.

Double encryption is applied to the data at step 224 as discussed above.In some embodiments, the first level of encryption will use the LBAassociated with the data as a first auxiliary data value. The secondlevel of encryption will use the physical block address (PBA) associatedwith the selected target location for the data as a second auxiliarydata value. The resulting double encrypted data are stored in theselected memory location at step 226.

The data are subsequently retrieved from the selected locationresponsive to an operation by the device 100. The data may be retrievedresponsive to a host request to return the data previously stored instep 226. Alternatively, the data may be retrieved for other reasons,such as to migrate the data to a new location in the memory.

During a host data retrieval operation, the flow passes to step 228 inwhich double decryption is applied to the data, and the recoveredplaintext is returned to the host, step 230. During a data migrationoperation, single level decryption is applied at step 232, and a newsecond level of encryption is employed at step 234. The newly encrypteddata are thereafter written to the new target memory location.

Benefits associated with the cascaded encryption process of FIG. 10 inthe context of a flash memory array can be understood with reference toFIG. 11, which illustrates a number of flash memory cells 240. Thememory cells are arranged in a NAND configuration and include localizeddoped regions 242 in a semiconductor substrate 244. A gate structure 246is provided between each adjacent pair of the doped regions 242 so thateach cell takes a general nMOSFET configuration.

Each gate structure 246 includes a floating gate (FG) 248, a controlgate (CG) 250 and intervening isolation regions 252, 254. Data arestored by accumulating charge on the floating gate 248. The presence ofaccumulated charge raises the threshold voltage required on the controlgate 250 place the cell in a drain-source conductive state acrosschannel CH. A separate erasure operation is required to removeaccumulated charge from the floating gate.

The cells can be configured as multi-level cells (MLC) through thestorage of multiple states. For example, four different levels ofaccumulated charge (from substantially no charge to a maximum level ofcharge) can be used to enable each MLC to store 2 bits of data (e.g.,11, 10, 01, 00). Due to the need to carry out a separate erasureoperation to remove the storage state of previously programmed cells, itwill readily apparent that the cascaded encryption operation discussedin FIG. 10 will ensure that each version of the same plaintext (ormodified versions thereof) stored in different locations will have beensubjected to a different encryption mechanism.

Moreover, a variety of laboratory techniques are available to amotivated attacker and can be used to detect previously stored states ofthe flash memory cells 240, even after multiple erasures and dataoverwrites have been applied. Accordingly, the cascaded encryption ofFIG. 10 can further enhance data security by using different encryptionmechanisms upon multiple copies of the same plaintext data that werestored in different locations in the array.

While the foregoing embodiments have been directed to flash memorycells, it will be appreciated that the cascaded encryption discussedabove can be readily adapted for other types of memory. FIG. 12 shows adisc memory 260 to which the cascaded encryption of FIG. 10 can bereadily applied. The disc 260 stores data in the form of magnetizationtransitions along concentric tracks 262 defined on the disc recordingsurface. A moveable actuator 264 is used to align a data read/writetransducer 266 with the respective tracks to read data from and writedata to the tracks.

Double encryption as disclosed herein can be applied in a variety ofways to data written to the respective tracks. In some embodiments, thetracks are divided up into a number of concentric zones, with each zonehaving an associated band key that is incorporated in the first level ofencryption to all the data stored in that zone. The second level ofencryption can incorporate physical address information such as discsurface, band, track number, angular location, time/date stamp, writecounts and so on, as before.

FIG. 13 shows another memory configuration in which the cascadedencryption set forth herein can be readily implemented. The memory isformed from an array of spin-torque transfer random access memory(STRAM) cells 270. Each memory cell comprises a magnetic tunnelingjunction 272 with a variable magnetization free layer 274, a fixedmagnetization reference layer 276, and an intervening barrier layer 278.The MTJ 272 is in series with a switching device 280, characterized asan nMOSFET.

Data are stored by the MTJ 272 in relation to the orientation of thefree layer 274 relative to the reference layer 276. Generally, the MTJ272 may exhibit a lower relative electrical resistance in a parallelstate, and a higher electrical resistance in an antiparallel state. Theprogrammed state of the cell 270 can be sensed in relation to a voltagedrop across the cell responsive to a low magnitude read current.

FIG. 14 sets forth another memory configuration in which the disclosedcascaded encryption can be used. The memory constitutes an array ofresistive random access memory (RRAM) cells 290. Each cell has aprogrammable resistive element 292 formed from opposing electrodes 294,296 and an intervening oxide layer 298. A filament 300 can beselectively formed across the oxide layer (and subsequently removed) toalter the overall resistance of the memory cell 290. As before, theelement 290 can be placed in series with a switching device 280 toprovide selective access to the individual cells.

It will be appreciated that the various embodiments of the presentinvention can provide benefits over the existing art. Cascadedencryption using a hidden key tied to the physical address of the memorycan ensure that different copies/versions of selected plaintext will besubjected to different encryption mechanisms.

During the encryption and decryption process involved in migrating thedata to a new location, the data remain partially encrypted (that is,the data are only partially decrypted) before being re-encrypted. Thisadds further security in that an attacker may not be able to determinethe encryption mechanism by inducing migration (e.g., a copy function)of data to a new location, nor discover the underlying plaintext duringsaid migration.

While a variety of types and styles of memories have been disclosed,such are merely exemplary as the various techniques set forth herein canbe adapted to a wide variety of applications and environments.Similarly, while a variety of types and styles of ciphers and keys havebeen disclosed, such are merely exemplary as the various techniques setforth herein can be adapted or modified as desired, without limitation,depending on the requirements of a given application. Nothing disclosedin the foregoing illustrative embodiments is intended or contemplated asbeing necessary for implementation or limiting to the scope of theclaimed subject matter.

It is to be understood that even though numerous characteristics andadvantages of various embodiments of the present invention have been setforth in the foregoing description, together with details of thestructure and function of various embodiments of the invention, thisdetailed description is illustrative only, and changes may be made indetail, especially in matters of structure and arrangements of partswithin the principles of the present invention to the full extentindicated by the broad general meaning of the terms in which theappended claims are expressed.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method comprising: encrypting input data inrelation to a first auxiliary data value to provide first levelciphertext; subsequently encrypting the first level ciphertext inrelation to a second auxiliary data value associated with one or moreattributes of a first physical location in a non-volatile memory toprovide second level ciphertext; storing the second level ciphertext inthe first physical location of the non-volatile memory; and subsequentlymigrating the input data from the first physical location to a secondphysical location in the non-volatile memory by partially decrypting thesecond level ciphertext to recover the first level ciphertext from thefirst physical location without recovering the corresponding input datain an unencrypted form, re-encrypting the recovered first levelciphertext using a third auxiliary data value associated with the secondphysical location to provide third level ciphertext, and storing thethird level ciphertext in the second selected physical location whilemaintaining the second level ciphertext in the first physical location.2. The method of claim 1, further comprising a subsequent step oferasing the first physical location to remove the second levelciphertext stored therein.
 3. The method of claim 1, in which the secondauxiliary data value comprises a physical block address (PBA) of theselected physical location in the non-volatile memory.
 4. The method ofclaim 1, in which the second auxiliary data value comprises anaccumulated write count indicative of a total number of write eventsassociated with the first physical location in the non-volatile memory.5. The method of claim 1, in which the first auxiliary data valuecomprises a logical block address (LBA) associated with the input data.6. The method of claim 1, in which the non-volatile memory comprises aflash memory array of flash memory cells.
 7. The method of claim 1, inwhich the non-volatile memory comprises a selected one of a disc memory,an array of spin-torque transfer random access memory (STRAM) cells, oran array of resistive random access memory (RRAM) cells.
 8. The methodof claim 1, further comprising: dividing the non-volatile memory into aplurality of bands each comprising a plurality of available physicallocations for the storage of encrypted data; assigning a unique secondauxiliary data value to each of the plurality of bands; identifying thesecond auxiliary data value assigned to the band which includes thefirst physical location; and using the identified second auxiliary datavalue to subsequently encrypt the first level ciphertext to provide thesecond level ciphertext.
 9. A data storage device, comprising a memorymodule comprising a non-volatile solid-state memory, and a controllerconfigured to store input data received from a host in a first physicaladdress of the memory by applying multi-level encryption to the inputdata in relation to a first auxiliary data value associated with a firstphysical address in the non-volatile memory to generate a first set ofciphertext and by storing the first set of ciphertext to the firstphysical address in the non-volatile memory, the controller furtherconfigured to migrate the input user data from the first physicaladdress to a second physical address in the non-volatile memory bydecrypting the first set of ciphertext using the first auxiliary valueto provide partially decrypted ciphertext that remains encrypted by atleast one level of said multi-level encryption, by re-encrypting thepartially decrypted ciphertext in relation to a different, secondauxiliary data value associated with the second physical address in thenon-volatile memory to generate a second set of ciphertext, and bywriting the second set of ciphertext to the second physical address inthe non-volatile memory while the first set of ciphertext remains storedin the first physical address in the non-volatile memory.
 10. The datastorage device of claim 9, in which the controller applies a first levelof encryption using a logical block address (LBA) value associated withthe input data, and applies a second level of encryption using aphysical block address (PBA) value associated with the first physicaladdress in the non-volatile memory.
 11. The data storage device of claim10, in which the controller further applies the second level ofencryption using an accumulated write count indicative of a total numberof write operations to the first physical location.
 12. The data storagedevice of claim 9, in which memory is a flash memory, the first physicaladdress in the non-volatile memory is disposed within a first erasureblock of the flash memory, and the second physical address in thenon-volatile memory is disposed within a different, second erasure blockof the flash memory.
 13. The data storage device of claim 9, thecontroller migrating the data to the second physical location responsiveto a garbage collection operation in which the first physical address inthe non-volatile memory is prepared for an erasure operation.
 14. Thedata storage device of claim 9, in which the memory is a flash memory.15. The data storage device of claim 9, in which the memory is a spintorque transfer random access memory (STRAM).
 16. The data storagedevice of claim 9, in which the memory is a resistive random accessmemory (RRAM).
 17. The data storage device of claim 9, in which therespective first and second sets of ciphertext are respectivelyencrypted using a physical block address (PBA) and an accumulated writecount value associated with the respective first and second physicallocations.
 18. A data storage device, comprising: a solid-statenon-volatile memory module; a storage module adapted to, responsive toreceipt of input data from a host device, store the input data to afirst physical location in the memory module by applying multi-levelencryption to the input data in relation to a first auxiliary data valueassociated with a first physical address in the non-volatile memory togenerate a first set of ciphertext and by storing the first set ofciphertext to the first physical address in the non-volatile memory; anda migration module adapted to, responsive to a garbage collectionoperation, migrate the input user data from the first physical addressto a second physical address in the non-volatile memory by decryptingthe first set of ciphertext using the first auxiliary value to providepartially decrypted ciphertext that remains encrypted by at least onelevel of said multi-level encryption, by re-encrypting the partiallydecrypted ciphertext in relation to a different, second auxiliary datavalue associated with the second physical address in the non-volatilememory to generate a second set of ciphertext, and by writing the secondset of ciphertext to the second physical address in the non-volatilememory while the first set of ciphertext remains stored in the firstphysical address in the non-volatile memory.
 19. The data storage deviceof claim 18, wherein the respective first and second sets of ciphertextare respectively encrypted using a physical block address (PBA) and anaccumulated write count value associated with the respective first andsecond physical locations
 20. The data storage device of claim 18, thememory module comprising a flash memory array.